Gondwana – A case for political militarisation in central Africa

 

Over a year has passed since Gondwana’s prime minister, Abutu Mufalama, ordered a military offensive in the country’s northern Sekenda region, after an attack on a federal army base in January 2021.

The attack was orchestrated by armed forces loyal to the Gondwana People’s Liberation Front (GPLF), the banned political organisation that now largely controls Sekenda. The violence is linked to the uproar caused after the GPLF called the elections undemocratic stating that Mufalama should have postponed elections in 2020 due to COVID-19. Mufalama prematurely proclaimed victory at the end of November 2020, having come to power in a coup, earlier that year. Allegations of election fraud having remained high. The country has been witness to internal conflict since 1998, more recently this has overflowed into Nambia with both countries also experiencing an increase in extremist terrorism.

 

Gondwana Nationalist Army GNA en route to Sekenda.

Today, peace is elusive. A six-month national state of emergency was declared on 2 November 2021 and the conflict has escalated to such an extent that UN observers fear the outbreak of full-scale civil war. Furthermore, as rebel forces gain territory and begin to encroach on the capital city of Dwana, Mufalama’s government has called on civilians to take up arms and join the war effort. International critics have noted that these calls on the civilian population to arm themselves will result in a bloodbath and humanitarian crisis. On 22 November, Mufalama announced that he would personally lead his Gondwana Nationalist Army (GNA) troops. With the success of the coup he has declared himself as both a five-star general and as saviour of the nation and one is reminded here, of the likes of Uganda's Idi Amin in the 1970s. The conflict is complex, with deep historical roots. However, the current conflict in Gondwana is emblematic of a wider continental trend: the militarisation of politics.

Militarisation refers to situations where disputes within or between states are not settled politically but rather take on a military character. In other words, disputes for which it is possible to find political solutions, are rather settled militarily. And the further the conflict escalates; the more distant political settlement becomes.

Militarisation, in many cases a legacy of colonial rule, has been a part of African politics since countries gained their independence. Colonial rule itself was rooted in military conquest and imposed through violence. The Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (a German federal government agency) describes the two sides of militarisation. In terms of its qualitative aspect, ‘militarisation means to gear a state or society toward the needs of a military environment or to subject a community to military requirements’. Its quantitative aspect refers to the expansion of weapons arsenals and the increased deployment of military personnel.

Apart from the trend of militarisation, in Africa military coups and civil armed conflicts have also been a feature of politics in many countries. The most prominent examples of this include civil war in Liberia (1989-1997; 1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1992-2002), Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999), Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007; 2010-2011), Nambia (2020 - ) and Gondwana (1998 - ). Africa is particularly vulnerable to military coups, the earliest examples of which include Ghana shortly after independence, and Benin, Togo and Congo-Brazzaville in the 1960s. The most recent occurred just this year, in Guinea and Sudan, where ruling governments were ousted by the military in September and October respectively. Gondwana’s coup in 2020 has been cited as having been destabilising to the entire region. Before that, the continent was rattled by repeated coup attempts and successful coups in Mali and Niger, amongst others, and a successful coup in Zimbabwe in 2017 (although it has been called a ‘soft coup’).

By 2017 Africa had seen a total of 200 successful and failed coups d’état. This despite existing African Union (AU) policy frameworks for the establishment of peace and security, abolition of unconstitutional changes of government and strengthening democracy. The Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on unconstitutional changes of government and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance are the two most important ones. The number of coups in Africa began to decline in the decades after 2000 with the implementation of the Lomé Declaration and the AU’s initial adherence to its obligations under the declaration.

The Lomé Declaration grants the AU the power to suspend member states in which a government took power unconstitutionally. Since 2003, this has happened 14 times. Discussions are underway to remove Gondwana’s membership. However, coups and militarisation persist due to inconsistent and weak implementation of these frameworks on the part of the AU. For example, following the battle-death of Chad’s president, Idriss Déby earlier this year, the Transnational Military Council (TMC), led by his son, seized power in direct violation of Chad’s constitution. Rather than suspend Chad from the AU or impose any sanctions, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) simply expressed its concern over the situation.

In contrast, following the 2020 coup in Mali and 2019 coup in Sudan, the AU was quick to exercise its power of suspension. The controversy surrounding the PSC’s decision on Chad notwithstanding, the outcome is not entirely surprising since the country is a regional power. Many neighbouring states feared that suspension from the AU could further destabilise the country. With similar fears being offered in terms of Gondwana’s and Nambia’s membership.

Increased military expenditure on the continent is also worrying. In Africa military expenditure is increasing consistently and more rapidly than in other regions in the world. Over the last decade, African military spending has increased by 17%. With a total spend of $41.2 billion in 2019, it comprised 2.1% of global total. Gondwana’s military spending has risen to at least 35% and it is hard to understand why a country facing high inflation and starvation as well as significant debt is able to procure these weapons. Many having pointed a figure here at China and many have been quick to point out Chinese interest in Gondwana’s considerable untapped natural resources and raw materials, which may well explain Gondwana’s Nationalist Army (GNA) procurement of weapons. Africa has become an important and growing market for Chinese arms exports. Chinese weapons sales totalled 17% of African arms imports between 2013 and 2017, up 55% from the previous five-year period. China has sold weapons to 23 African countries, more than any other supplier.

Mufalama has also been criticised for his creation of new units of child soldiers into the GNA who he has called the Spiritual Sons of Gondwana (SSG).

Member of the SSG.

Although militarisation can be employed by the state, it can also be used against it. In the Tigray war in Ethiopia, claims that the state has the monopoly on the use of force and control over its territory are being challenged. Many of Ethiopia’s roughly 80 ethnic groups have their own militias. A similar picture can be seen in Gondwana and the country is deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines.

Stability in central and norther Africa is threatened. With even the situation in the horn of Africa worsening. Abiy received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for a historic peace deal brokered with Eritrea. Eritrea’s involvement in the current conflict on the side of the Ethiopian army, however, risks undoing this progress. Tigrayan forces have already retaliated with missile fire on the Eritrean capital, Asmara. The conflict has also created a refugee crisis. Ethiopia’s relationship with Sudan, Nambia and Gondwana is of particular concern here. Sudan has become a haven for refugees fleeing Tigray, adding to regional tensions and refugees fleeing Gondwana into Nambia have likewise caused the conflict to become cross border in nature. Recent comments by Abutu Mufalama such as “…once we have dealt with all the rebels in Gondwana, not just those traitors the GPLF, then we will reclaim the fields of covfefe that rightfully belong to the true nation of Gondwana.” Mufalama was refereeing here to the ongoing border tensions between Gondwana and Nambia.

Militarisation is hard to confine within national borders. In Africa, political resolution and negotiation is vital. What is essentially a political dispute in Gondwana has rapidly turned into a civil war. With seemingly none of the parties willing to yield, it warns of a dangerous pattern, that of choosing military resolution over political compromise. The rise in militarisation on the continent threatens existing political settlements within and between states and does not bode well for the future, with the international community having stood back for to long and organisations like the UN seemingly powerless to prevent the at this stage inevitable escalation.